Description

When does nuclear latencythe technical capacity to build the bombenable states to pursue effective coercion

In Leveraging Latency Tristan A Volpe argues that having greater capacity to build weaponry doesnt translate to greater coercive advantage Volpe finds that there is a tradeoff between threatening proliferation and promising nuclear restraint States need just enough bombmaking capacity to threaten proliferation but not so much that it becomes too difficult for them to offer nonproliferation assurances The boundaries of this sweet spot align with the capacity to produce the fissile material at the heart of an atomic weapon

To test this argument Volpe includes comparative case studies of four countries that leveraged latency against superpowers Japan West Germany North Korea and Iran In doing so Volpe identifies a generalizable mechanismthe threatassurance tradeoffthat explains why more power often makes compellence less likely to work This framework illuminates how technology shapes broader bargaining dynamics and helps to refine policy options for inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons As nuclear technology continues to cast a shadow over the global landscape Leveraging Latency provides a systematic assessment of its coercive utility